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  While federal financial rescues have become a common response to crises, federal 
provision of finance was not one of the original powers of the federal government.  One 
man, Eugene Meyer, is largely responsible for the origin of federal financial rescues, 
through both the War Finance Corporation and Reconstruction Finance Corporation.  
Meyer learned laissez faire economics from William Graham Sumner at Yale.  However, 
German economist Adolph Wagner’s state-socialism philosophy heavily influenced 
Meyer’s thinking, and Meyer developed an interventionist philosophy.  Serving in key 
government positions, Meyer put his beliefs into practice.  These channels of influence 
and the resulting policies are examined.   
 
Fields: B - History of Thought: N - Economic History 
 
During the recent Great Recession, the federal government provided hundreds of billions of 
dollars of financing to troubled financial institutions and other corporations.  Federal financial 
rescue of private business is justified on the grounds that without this intervention, the recession 
might have become a depression, and such assistance would speed economic recovery.  
Similarly, in an effort to contain the recession, the Federal Reserve, under the authority of 
section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, created facilities to extend credit to many sectors of the 
economy, far beyond its normal lender-of-last-resort lending to banks. 
While not without its critics, federal financial rescues have become a common, often 
expected, response to crises.  In addition, federal financial intermediation has become a 
continuing function of government, with activities including direct loans, loan guarantees, 
government sponsored enterprises, and rescues of private businesses, including financial 
institutions.   
Federal provision of financing was not an original function of our national government.  
Saulnier, Halcrow and Jacoby (1958) trace the origin of federal financial intermediation to the 
creation of the federal land banks in 1916.  However, while the federal land banks were federally 
chartered, capitalized, and supervised, they are cooperatively operated by the owner-borrowers. 
The first federally operated credit agency was the War Finance Corporation (WFC), 
established in 1918.  The WFC’s war-time objective was to make loans to businesses vital to the 
war effort that were unable to obtain private funding.  The war ended shortly after its creation, 
but the WFC continued its operations attempting to stabilize bond prices for the Treasury, 
another function provided by the original legislation.   
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 Eugene Meyer, the Managing Director of the WFC, worked single-handedly to obtain 
Congressional approval to extend the life of the WFC with authorization to engage in the first 
federal financial rescue activities, providing financing in an effort to promote exports and then to 
assist the distressed agricultural sector.  Then, during the 1929-1933 contraction, Meyer, now 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, convinced President Hoover to recreate the WFC as the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to assist and rescue troubled banks, other financial 
institutions, and railroads.  While Meyer’s stated intention was that the RFC be a temporary 
agency as was the WFC, the RFC’s operations were greatly expanded during the New Deal and 
Second World War, as President Roosevelt welcomed the many opportunities afforded by the 
off-budget lending authority of the RFC. 
Eugene Meyer (1875 – 1959) is an important, but little-known figure in interwar U.S. 
economic policy making.  He orchestrated the original federal financial rescues through the WFC 
and RFC.  In addition to serving as Governor of the Federal Reserve Board during most of the 
Great Contraction, he also served as federal Farm Loan Commissioner.   Interestingly, while 
Meyer’s education at Yale was under the tutelage of the champion of laissez-faire, William 
Graham Sumner, Meyer’s economic philosophy about the appropriate role of government was 
heavily influenced by the German economist and state socialist, Adolph Wagner. 
Meyer was, successively, a very successful and prosperous investment banker, a federal 
government official and economic policy maker, and a newspaper publisher.  He received formal 
education in economics at Yale and afterward studied in France and Germany.  Events during his 
investment banking career also shaped his view of the functioning of markets. 
This paper examines how Meyer’s economic philosophy led to the origin of federal financial 
rescues.  First, the thinking of his two influential teachers, Sumner and Wagner, are reviewed.  
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 Then Meyer’s own economic philosophy is presented.  The rescue operations of the WFC and 
RFC are recounted, followed by concluding remarks. 
William Graham Sumner 
  After a year of study at the University of California, Meyer enrolled in Yale in 1893, and 
by accelerating his studies, graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1895.  At Yale, Meyer studied social 
science during his final year with William Graham Sumner.   
  Joseph Dorfman (1949) identifies Sumner as the great spokesman of the New England 
School of laissez faire.  His conservative social philosophy followed Herbert Spencer.  He was 
influenced by Malthus, arguing that living standards were determined by the ratio of population 
to land.  The wealthy were the product of natural selection and helping the poor interfered with 
laissez faire and thus was wrong. 
  Richard Hofstadter (1959, 51) characterizes Sumner as “The most vigorous and 
influential social Darwinist in America…”  and states that he had the widest following of any 
faculty member at Yale.  Sumner read economics as a boy (approximately age 14) and claimed 
his ideas about economics were all formed at that time.  His economics synthesized classical 
economics, the Protestant ethic and Darwinian natural selection.  Hofstadter notes that Sumner’s 
writings have a religious fervor, not surprisingly, as Sumner was a minister prior to becoming a 
professor.  Sumner believed that men should accept the natural law of competition: “Competition 
is a law of nature which can no more be done away with than gravitation” (quoted in Hofstadter 
1959, 66). 
  Sumner’s economics are thoroughly examined by Dominick Armentano (1967).  He finds 
that Sumner’s influences include Ricardo as well as Malthus and Darwin.  His model was based 
on perfect competition and assumed full employment.   The proper activities of government 
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 include upholding law and order, the administration of  justice, the protection of private property, 
and the preservation of civil liberty.  Beyond these, laissez faire was to be the norm.  Sumner 
said that there “are not many ways that governmental interference in economic matters can bring 
about the desired beneficial consequences” (quoted in Armentano 1967, 133).  Sumner 
particularly opposed tariffs.  He opposed bimetallism in favor of the gold standard, but he did 
like National banks and a uniform currency and said that unions were legitimate.  He also wrote 
on monetary economics. 
Bruce Curtis (1981) recounts that Sumner did favor public education for all.  For Sumner, 
Smith’s “Invisible Hand” became  social Darwinism.  Sumner “replaced God with nature as 
man’s disciplinarian and judge when he transgressed natural law” (Curtis 1981, 76).  Curtis 
explains that in 1896 Sumner began his move from economics to sociology, for which he is far 
better known.  Sumner most lasting publication is his book on sociology, Folkways (1906).  
Curtis (1964) and Robert Bannister (1973) both argue that with his move into sociology, his 
philosophy evolved.  Curtis claims that in his last years, to defend the middle-class society in 
which he believed, Sumner’s views became progressive, no longer social Darwinist. 
Both Armentano and Curtis note that Sumner was not influential in economics beyond his 
own time.  Curtis (1964) argues that in economics, Sumner was a defender, not a questioner.   
Perhaps Sumner’s most noted contribution to economics is his “Forgotten Man”: 
…A and B decide what C shall do for D. …I call C the Forgotten Man, 
because I have never seen that any notice was taken of him in any of the 
discussions.  (Sumner 1883, 23). 
 
Sumner’s Forgotten Man is the middle class worker going about his life, working at his job, 
raising his family and enjoying the fruits of his labor.  However, the state may tax him to support 
others.  To Sumner, this was the ultimate evil: 
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 …a man whose labor and self-denial may be diverted from his maintenance to 
that of some other man is not a free man, and approached more or less toward 
the position of a slave.  (Sumner 1883, 15). 
 
The man who has done nothing to raise himself above poverty finds that the 
social doctors flock about him,…and promising him the aid of the State to 
give him what the other had to work for.  (Sumner 1883, 23). 
 
Sumner was egalitarian in his support of the Forgotten Woman as well.   He wrote at length 
about how women sewing garments were required to purchase their own thread, and how the 
higher price of thread due to a protective tariff subtracted from their meager $0.75 daily wage 
(Sumner 1883, 145 – 8). 
Government intervention in economic affairs created monopolies, the purpose of which was 
the exploitation of others: 
…if, however, the state enters as an agent into the industrial or social 
relations of its own subjects, it becomes the greatest and worst of all 
monopolies, the one best worth having under one’s control, the best prize 
of base struggles, and the most powerful engine by which men may 
exploit others.  (in Keller and Davie 1924, 227) 
 
Sumner believed that the German historical school was attracting a generation of American 
economist away from the truth (Bannister 1973).
1  The German historical school favored an 
extensive welfare state, that Sumner believed required a sacrifice of liberty:   
…if we want to be taken care of as Prussians and Frenchman are, we must 
give up something of our personal liberty  (in Keller and Davie 1924, 
268). 
 
  What Meyer learned from Sumner was that economic systems were determined by the 
natural law; that government intervention into economic affairs violated natural law, burdened 
                                                      
1 Dorfman (1949, 206 - 210) notes that by 1890, Sumner still refused to join the American Economic Association 
that was founded in 1885 by German-trained and/or influenced Americans.  The  original aim of the association was 
to promote progressive economic policies in the United States, although the constitution was soon changed to  focus 
on research so as to attract young economists having a classical orientation.   
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 the forgotten man, and created exploitive monopolies; and thus laissez faire was the only 
appropriate policy. 
Adolph Wagner 
Within a year of his graduation, Meyer went to Europe, working and studying in Paris, 
various German cities, and London.  While in Berlin he took several courses at the University of 
Berlin.  One course had a profound impact on his economic thinking.  The course, attended by 
about 1000 students, was “Selected Questions in Social Policies” taught by the German state 
socialist, Adolph Wagner.  What Meyer heard from Wagner was opposite of the teachings of 
William Graham Sumner.
2 
  While often identified as a member of the German historical school, Wagner was not 
strictly a member of the school (Senn 1997).  While sharing similar views on the role of the state 
and belonging to a common society, Wagner was often critical of the historical school and 
debated with them over methodology.  He rejected the historical school’s inductive approach, 
favoring deductive reasoning and the use of statistics.  Wagner described himself as a “German 
State socialist, who is used to government intervention and disposed to favor it…” (quoted in 
Senn 1997, 58). 
  Wagner was an original member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Union for Social 
Politics) founded by his contemporary and leader of the younger historical school, Gustov 
Schmoller.
3  The Verein was explicitly political, promoting a welfare state, or “social market 
economy” as it is known in Germany (Senn 1991).  These conservative socialists were known as 
Kathedersozialisten (Professorial Socialists or Socialists of the Chair). 
                                                      
2 Meyer also read Wagner’s books (Meyer 1961, 50). 
3 Wagner’s active participation in the Verein ended around 1877 because many members held views more moderate  
than state socialism (Senn 1997). 
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   Dorfman (1955) characterizes the Verein as a revolt against 18
th century reasoning based 
on natural law.  Extreme laissez faire was opposed.  Members saw a conflict between self-
interest and moral forces. 
  Donald Wagner (1939) describes Wagner as accepting self-interest but rejected the 
classical application emphasizing laissez faire.  Wagner combined historical methods and 
deductive reasoning, and was critical of the historical school’s rejection of abstract and deductive 
reasoning. 
  Carlson (1999) notes that Wagner sought a middle way between British liberalism’s 
focus on production and scientific socialism’s focus on distribution.  The most important roles of 
the state were to create public order and national defense.  Regulation was necessary to protect 
the weak from the economically strong.  He favored nationalization of certain industries to 
generate revenue for the redistribution of income.  Also, to create a new social economics, 
attention must be paid to matters of psychology, customs, the legal system, ownership and 
freedom.   Wagner did worry about the impact of the state on civil liberties that he hoped, as 
much as possible, to preserve (U. Backhaus 2003). 
  Wagner’s moral reasoning derived from his Christianity (Drechsler 1997).
 4  Wagner 
explains this in his famous “Speech on the Social Question”;    
My idea, briefly stated, proceeds from the notion that political economy 
must again partake rather of the character of an ethical science in order to 
be able properly to handle the social question. …I wish to stress the moral 
and therefore Christian obligations which wealth, education, and social 
position impose, even in dealing with the social question from the 
economic standpoint.  (in D. Wagner 1934, 489). 
  
                                                      
4 Wagner served for a time in the Prussian legislature as a member of the Christian Social Party, although this party 
is known for its anti-Semitism (Clark 1940).  Senn (1997, 104 – 100) critiques Clark’s (1940) assertion that Wagner 
was a forerunner of Nazism. 
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   While Sumner believed the distribution of income should be derived from natural 
selection, Wagner did not, and unlike Sumner, argued for redistribution: 
…there will always be differences in wealth which cannot be traced to 
actual merit or personal guilt.  But it is for us to diminish, so far as we can, 
the resulting evils and existing inequities.  (in D. Wagner 1934, 506). 
 
Like Sumner, Wagner is perhaps best known for his normative work on the role of the 
state, that economists “should point out what should be” (quoted in Senn 1997, 61).  Also, both 
wrote on monetary issues.   
Wagner’s lasting scientific contribution is his work in fiscal policy.  Specifically, 
Wagner’s Law predicts an ever expanding role for the state:  
On the whole, the realm of the state’s activities has become ever more 
extensive, as the concept of the state developed, as people achieved higher 
and higher levels of civilization and culture, and as more demands were 
consequently addressed to the state.  This has also led to a continuous 
increase in the required state revenues, an increase which was generally 
even higher relative to the increase of the extent of state activity.  The 
cause  for this relative difference lies in the means employed by the state: 
these have become ever more complex, comprehensive and costly as one 
and the same need required an ever more perfect, higher and refined way 
of being satisfied. …the requirements of the state are constantly rising as 
people progress.  (quoted in U. Backhaus 2003, 125). 
 
  Carlson (1999) and Senn (1997) attempt to assess Wagner’s influence in the United 
States.  Dorfman (1955) does the same for the German historical school.  All find that a primary, 
likely the most important, channel of influence was through the many Americans that studied in 
Germany.  This was also the channel of German influence on Eugene Meyer, the class he took 




Eugene Meyer studied economics under two very influential economists who espoused 
opposing philosophies.  At Yale Meyer actively engaged Sumner in discussions of his teachings.  
Meyer’s concern for individual liberty made him receptive to Sumner’s advocacy of competitive 
markets.  At the time of his graduation, Meyer felt that what he learned from Sumner was the 
most significant contribution of his Yale education (Pusey 1974, 22). 
After reading and studying under Wagner, Meyer concluded that Wagner’s views were 
appropriate for Germany with its inflexible labor market, but that level of government 
intervention was not yet needed in the United States.  But if that was the case, economics was not 
based on universal natural laws.  He concluded that the appropriate economic policies were 
relative, determined by time and place: 
Therefore political science or political economy was not a science but an 
art, because if it were a science, it would be of universal application. 
…That gave a sort of pragmatic approach to my mind on these problems – 
that is, the fact of the economy to which political economy applies is the 
deciding factor in what kind of practical application of what kind of 
principles are suited.  What may be good for us today may be no good in 
twenty years; or what was good twenty years ago is no good for today. 
(Meyer 1961, 50-51). 
 
As the United States approached entering World War I, Meyer delivered a speech, in 
which he rejected laissez faire and called for greater cooperation between government and 
business:
5 
Our policy is still too much under the influence of outworn  laissez faire 
doctrine.  Europe, even prior to the war, had as its policy faire marcher.
6 
 
                                                      
5 The speech was “Some After-War Economic Problems”, delivered to the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science on December 29, 1916. 
6 In this context, faire marcher means taking action to make things happen. 
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 More than ever before Government and big business need to take council 
together.         (Meyer papers, box 78) 
 
Thus, Meyer arrived at the Progressive Era conclusion that the laissez faire philosophy 
was outdated.  He believed that “abnormal” conditions often controlled markets, and that men 
attempted to control and regulate markets for their own benefit (Eugene Meyer papers, Box 180). 
Meyer was no stranger to market instability.  In 1910, while traveling in Asia and Europe 
with his new wife, Meyer received cables about a copper production and price war that was 
depressing the value of his investments.  Meyer negotiated an “understanding” among the 
principal producers to cut production, ending the price war.  The agreement was unwritten, 
leaving no evidence of explicit price fixing that would be construed as an antitrust violation 
(Pusey, pp. 82-84). 
Before Meyer entered government service during World War I, he advised Bernard 
Baruch, who was negotiating the purchase of 45 million pounds of copper for the armed services.  
Baruch sought Meyer’s advice regarding a “fair” price, and Meyer recommended a price based 
on a ten-year average that the copper producers accepted, even though it was significantly below 
the prevailing market price. This negotiated agreement earned both men considerable notoriety. 
In Washington, Meyer eventually joined Baruch’s Raw Materials Committee of the 
General Munitions Board, later the War Industries Board.  Meyer became director of the 
nonferrous metals unit of the Raw Materials Committee.
7  Acting for Baruch, Meyer prevented 
an army purchase of steel at what Meyer felt was an exorbitant price.  Meyer suspected that 
companies were canceling civilian contracts hoping to sell at higher prices to the government.  
                                                      
7 His responsibilities included procurement of copper, lead, zinc, antimony, aluminum, nickel, silver and later 
cement (Pusey, p.140). 
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 He advocated the creation of a central purchasing agency to “regulate the whole industrial 
situation.”  In his position at the War Industry Board, Meyer sought to purchase metals at prices 
that he felt were “fair”  (Pusey, pp. 140 – 148; Eugene Meyer papers, Box 180). 
  Clearly Meyer believed that sizable price changes resulting from rapidly changing 
demand or supply could be “unfair.”  In such instances, Meyer felt action should be taken to 
“stabilize” markets.  With his background as a very successful investment banker, his solution 
was the provision of credit or financing until markets returned to a more “normal” condition.    
In an address about the WFC, Meyer advocated the federal provision of temporary 
financing of exports, claiming that the normal channels of export finance had broken down, and 
thus the WFC should make loans financing exports.  In the same speech he advocated 
government intervention in the labor market:
8 
The question of unemployment was more or less ignored by us – it was 
felt it might be left to take care of itself, and our old friend, “the law of 
supply and demand”, was relied upon until we suspended that law very 
materially during the period of war.  The “law of supply and demand” 
under certain conditions will always operate to bring about a result, but we 
have learned that if you want to get the result quickly, and are unwilling to 
allow the difficulties and sufferings which exist in connection with 
unemployment, we must at times act with regard to the social aspects of 
the problem which the brutal application of the old law of supply and 
demand does not contemplate.    (Meyer papers, box 78). 
  
Thus Meyer had abandoned the laissez-faire philosophy he had learned from Sumner at 
Yale for what he felt was a more pragmatic, interventionist approach to economic issues.   He 
summarized his change of thinking when discussing his proudest accomplishment in government 
service, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation:   
If William Graham Sumner spoke for the laissez-faire theory of the 
nineteenth century into which I was born, the RFC was the dramatic 
                                                      
8 The address “The War Finance Corporation” was delivered to a conference of governors and mayors with the 
President and Secretary of Labor on March 5, 1919. 
13 
 symbol of the opposite theory.  It represented the need for far-reaching 
governmental intervention in the functioning of the private enterprise 
system – a system which had undergone a cataclysmic cycle of boom and 
bust. (Meyer, 1954, p.22). 
The War Finance Corporation
9 
The War Finance Corporation (WFC) evolved from the Capital Issues Committee.  This 
committee, formed in January 1918 at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, was 
comprised of three members of the Federal Reserve Board.  The committee determined whether 
corporate and municipal borrowings would detract from the war effort, and recommended 
postponing issuing securities for projects that did not support the war effort.  Restricting 
unessential borrowings would also free resources for the war effort. 
Compliance with the committee’s recommendations was voluntary, but Treasury Secretary 
McAdoo wanted to formalize the authority and make it binding.  The War Finance Corporation 
Act, signed April 5, 1918, created the formal authority.  Compliance was now  mandatory for all 
security issues of $100,000 or more. 
The Act created a new, formal Capital Issues Committee comprised of seven members, three 
from the Fed and four unrestricted members.  The unrestricted members could be Fed or 
government officials or representatives from business.  
The WFC began operations on May 20, 1918.  In addition to restricting private borrowings,
10 
the WFC was to provide funding to industries essential to the war effort.  The WFC was 
capitalized at $500 million provided by the U.S. Treasury, and was authorized to borrow an 
additional $3,000 million through bond issues.  The WFC was an off-budget agency, not 
                                                      
9 This section is based primarily on the Eugene Meyer papers, box 180; Pusey, 1974; Saulnier, et al. al., 1958; and 
Willoughby, 1934. 
10 Willoughby (1934, p. 39) claims that the committee’s existence discourage many private applications. 
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 requiring annual appropriations.  The original legislation required the WFC to close six months 
after the end of the war; however, its existence was extended several times. 
Another provision of the act directed the WFC to purchase Liberty and subsequently Victory 
bonds to limit fluctuations in the market price of these bonds, as their prices had fallen sharply 
after they were issued, resulting in many complaints.   The WFC did engage in significant bond 
purchases.  While the Treasury sold short-term certificates of indebtedness at 6% to fund WFC 
purchases of 4-4.5% coupon bonds, the endeavor was profitable due to the significant discount at 
which the bonds sold during the buy-back period.  The deep price discounts at which the bonds 
sold suggest that stabilizing prices proved an elusive objective.  
Meyer was an original director of the WFC and was put in charge of the bond price-
stabilization program.  Federal Reserve Board Governor W. P. G. Harding was the original 
managing director of the WFC, but he rarely attended meetings and relied heavily on Meyer to 
run the agency.   Meyer was elected managing director in January 1919 following Harding’s 
resignation from the WFC board. 
As noted above Meyer felt that the World War had created an emergency situation for 
American agriculture, as the normal channels of export finance had broken down.  In 1919 
Meyer sought and gained Congressional approval for the WFC to make loans to European buyers 
to help American agricultural exports and American farmers.
11  Federal financial intermediation 
now was extended beyond the emergency of war to a perceived post-war emergency.  However, 
Treasury Secretary David Houston, a staunch advocate of laissez faire, decided to suspended 
WFC activities in May 1920.  Meyer resigned, as he was opposed to what he correctly felt were 
Houston’s deflationary polices, expressing his belief in the benefit of federal intervention: “that 
                                                      
11 This authority was granted in March 1919.  Meyer drafted the amendment authorizing export loans (Meyer, 1954, 
p. 11). 
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 the Corporation – if it had continued to function – would have been able to mitigate, to some 
degree at least, the suddenness and extent of the collapse in commodity markets and prices in the 
fall of 1920…” (Meyer, 1923, p. 83). 
But while Meyer had resigned, he had not retired from promoting continued WFC lending.  
He began a propaganda campaign seeking a revival of the WFC.  At the New York Chamber of 
Commerce he said: 
On principle, I have argued against [government interference in business].  
But we face an emergency in which private credits will not of their own accord be 
forthcoming to finance foreign trade.  The government alone is in a position to 
bolster and again set in motion the normal operations of the international credit 
mechanism… (Meyer papers, box 180) 
 
Meyer’s campaign succeeded.  Following the election, Meyer urged Congress to pass a 
resolution reviving the WFC’s operations, which it did in January 1921, even overriding 
President Wilson’s veto.  President Harding reappointed Meyer to the WFC board, and he was 
again elected managing director. 
In 1921, Congress passed Meyer’s bill known as the Agricultural Credits Act of 1921.  The 
bill transformed the WFC into a support agency for the distressed agricultural sector.  In addition 
to financing exports, the WFC’s activities expanded to include lending to rural banks and co-
operatives.  It was this version of the WFC that later was his model for the RFC. 
As a result of the 1921 Agricultural Credits Act, much of the WFC’s lending went to banks.  
The objective of the lending program was to assist banks and co-ops in agricultural regions.  
WFC loans provided banks with liquidity and the ability to repay loans to their correspondents, 
hopefully making the banks were more willing to carry farm loans than to call them, and to make 
new loans, providing relief for beleaguered farmers.  Total advances for agricultural and 
livestock purposes under the authority of the 1921 act were $298 billion, most of which was 
16 
 extended in 1921 and 1922.  Outstanding balances peaked at $201 billion in May 1922 (War 
Finance Corporation, 1926).  
With the creation of  the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks to provide agricultural 
financing on a permanent basis, Meyer felt the WFC was no longer needed, and worked to close 
the agency.
12  In January 1925 he returned $499 million of WFC capital to the Treasury, and 
resigned from the WFC.
 13   A small amount of direct lending continued through 1928, after 
which the WFC continued to collect on its outstanding loans until it was closed in 1939. 
WFC loans to industries essential to the war never approached the anticipated amount, as 
the war ended six months after WFC initiated its operations.
14  WFC purchases of Treasury 
bonds were sizable, but ultimately were financed by Treasury sales of short-term debt that 
financed the repurchase of the war bonds.  Rather than the volume of its lending, the significance 
of the WFC was the precedent it set for federal intervention into credit markets.  
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation
15 
Meyer was appointed Governor of the Federal Reserve Board in September 1930.  There was 
a banking crisis in the final months of 1930, and another banking crisis following Britain’s 
departure from the gold standard in September 1931.  To address banking problems, Meyer felt 
that a financial agency similar to the WFC was necessary even before Britain left gold.  
                                                      
12 The WFC’s lending authority ended on December 31, 1924, although a small amount of lending continued as 
“expense advances” (War Finance Corporation, 1926, p. 16).  If Meyer had felt a need for the WFC to continue, he 
likely would have again requested an extension from Congress. 
13 Meyer served as Commissioner of the Federal Farm Loan Board during the years 1927-1929, thereby remaining 
active in the federal provision of credit.  
14 WFC advances to business and agriculture from May through November 1918 totaled $71 million.  Still using its 
war powers, another $236 million was advanced after the war, almost all of which was lent to the nationalized 
railroads.  Export advances prior to suspension of operations were $46 million, and another $39 million was 
advanced for exports following the resumption of operations.  Advances to banks and co-ops under the 1921 
provisions totaled $298 million. Total advances, including the agricultural and livestock lending cited above through 
November 30, 1926 totaled $690 million.  Purchases of Liberty and Victory bonds from 1918 through 1920 totaled 
$2.1 billion. (War Finance Corporation, 1918, 1919, 1920 and 1926). 
15 This section is based primarily on the Eugene Meyer papers, Pusey (1974) and Butkiewicz (1995, 1998, 2002 and 
2008). 
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 However, President Hoover preferred voluntary private action, leading to the creation of the 
National Credit Corporation (NCC).  Due to the NCC’s ineffectiveness, Meyer convinced 
Hoover of the need for a federal agency. 
  The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) legislation was passed on January 22, 
1932.  Like the WFC, the RFC was initially capitalized by the U. S. Treasury at $500 million, 
and could issue bonds to the public or the Treasury to raise an additional $1.5 billion.  The 
RFC’s original powers authorized lending to banks and other financial institutions, railroads, and 
for crop loans.  An amendment to the RFC Act, The Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 
1932, approved on July 21, 1932 extended RFC lending powers to self-liquidating public works 
projects and authorization to lend to states to provide various types of relief (United States 
Congress  1932).
16  Total RFC lending in 1932 was $1.5 billion (Saulnier, et. al., p. 381).  
Subsequent amendments vastly expanded the scale and scope of RFC lending authority. 
Meyer viewed the RFC as supplementing and extending Federal Reserve lending authority, 
including making loans on low-quality assets that the Fed could not rediscount: 
I had to get the RFC to supplement the federal reserve with powers that 
the federal reserve didn’t have and couldn’t, wouldn’t, and shouldn’t have, 
such as making loans on slow assets.   They [the Fed] had a currency 
responsibility.  The RFC was there to take the slow assets the federal 
reserve couldn’t take. … The quick assets there wasn’t any trouble about.  
They [banks] could go to the federal reserve bank.  The trouble was they 
didn’t have enough of that kind of asset to meet the demands of the 
depositors by loans from the federal reserve bank or rediscounts, because 
of the sums being withdrawn.   …. I got up the RFC to save the federal 
reserve system, to do the things that we couldn’t do in the federal reserve.  
I used all the machinery of the federal reserve – the personnel – to get it 
into action fast!  (Meyer 1961, 679 – 681).
17 
                                                      
16 The amendment also contained an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, section 13(3) authorizing the Fed to 
lend to businesses and individuals in emergencies (United States Congress 1932, 17).  While not used much at that 
time, this authority was used extensively during the 2008 financial crisis. 
17 Meyer used the resources of the Federal Reserve to expedite RFC’s operations.  RFC loan offices were located in 




Meyer left the RFC Board at the end of July 1932 for health reasons.  In his later years, he 
stated that his intention was that the RFC be temporary, as was its predecessor, the WFC.  
However, President Roosevelt greatly expanded the RFC’s activities, financial many New Deal 
projects and agencies.
18  World War II raised RFC activity to a new high; with RFC activities 
and extensions of credit reaching 4.5% of GDP in 1944 (Figure 1).
19  Of the $33.3 billion 
disbursed by the RFC during its existence, $20.9 billion was disbursed to the RFC’s wartime 
subsidiaries.  As was the original purpose of the WFC, the RFC also financed businesses 
essential to the war effort.   
RFC lending decreased dramatically following the war.  Congressional concerns about the 
RFC’s post-war lending practices led to a decision to end RFC lending in 1953.  Its operations 
were terminated in 1957, with residual activities distributed to other governmental agencies.  
 While Meyer may have intended that the RFC to be a temporary agency, providing relief to 
troubled banks, the precedent he set through both the WFC and the RFC opened the door to a 
vast expansion of federal lending powers.  He had paved the way for a new and ultimately 
expanding role of government as a financial intermediary and rescuer of troubled businesses, a 
revolution in federal financial intervention.  The federal government has become a permanent 
and prominent influence in the allocation of credit. 
The Influence of Academic Scribblers 
Eugene Meyer disavowed the laissez faire economic philosophy he had learned from 
William Graham Sumner at Yale.  His thinking was heavily influenced by the German 
economics professor Adolph Wagner.  Meyer concluded that Wagner’s teachings were 
                                                      
18 For a more complete discussion of the RFC, see Butkiewicz (2002). 
19 Nominal GDP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis web site: http://www.bea.doc.gov/.  RFC data are 
from Secretary of the Treasury (1959).  
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 appropriate for Germany but not yet for the United States.  This conclusion convinced him that 
economics was not determined by universally applicable “natural laws”, as Sumner taught, but 
was relative to the circumstances.  Meyer concluded that economics was a pragmatic art, not a 
science (Meyer papers, box 179). 
Applying his pragmatic approach to economics, Meyer believed that markets function well 
under “normal” conditions, but that the “abnormal conditions” following the war created 
economic instability that could be remedied only through government intervention (Meyer 
papers, box 180).  Thus, he became the foremost proponent of federal government financial 
intervention to stabilize markets during periods of economic difficulty.   
His first duties during the war included purchasing essential commodities for the war effort. 
Frequently he would refuse to make purchases at the prevailing market price.  In these instances, 
he typically sought to negotiate a price he considered to be “fair”. 
His responsibilities at the War Finance Corporation included buying Liberty and Victory 
bonds to stabilize price fluctuations.  Later, he was able to convert the WFC into an export and 
then agricultural credit agency.  His objective was to stabilize markets, hopefully reversing some 
of the deflation that had depressed prices of agricultural products, thereby providing relief to 
distressed farmers.   
During the contraction phase of the Great Depression, Meyer again felt the need for a federal 
financial rescue, ultimately convincing President Hoover of the need for a federal financial 
agency.  Under Meyer, the RFC primarily lent money to provide liquidity to the distressed 
banking section, although RFC activities greatly increased during the New Deal and second 
world war.  
20 
 Meyer understood that the RFC was the direct opposite of laissez faire philosophy he had 
learned in college.  He concluded that “abnormal” circumstances justified government 
intervention.  However, he also felt that such intervention should be temporary, and should be 
terminated when conditions returned to “normal” (Meyer, 1954, p. 27).     
But the door that Meyer opened with the WFC and RFC was never closed.  During FDR’s 
presidency, the off-budget borrowing and lending powers of the RFC afforded numerous 
opportunities for federal intervention into the allocation of credit and the resulting resource 
allocation of the economy.  Federal intervention in the allocation of credit and financial rescues 
have continued to the present, much of it through the descendants of the RFC, including the 
Commodity Credit Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, Fannie Mae and the Small Business 
Administration. 
Had Eugene Meyer never held a government position, federal intervention into credit 
markets and the entire economy would likely have occurred, probably at a later date.  Meyer 
opened the door, but Roosevelt plowed a much wider path. 
Still, almost single-handedly, Eugene Meyer paved the way for a revolution of federal 
financial rescues in the American economy.  For better or worse, this is his legacy.   
21 
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